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 A B S T R A C T  
Good corporate governance is a critical aspect in banking industries because the larg-
est part of the source of funds is from public. Two of the important aspects of good
corporate governance are the role of the board of commissioners and transparency.
This study aimed to assess the effect of the implementation of good governance, which
is proxied by the role of the board of commissioners and transparency of financial and
non-financial condition, toward the operational efficiency and profitability of the na-
tional commercial banks in Indonesia. This study uses data of thirty six banks for five
years, from 2008 to 2012. Random effect panel data technique is used to analyze the
data since this technique can increase the power of statistical analysis. The results
shows that in terms of efficiency only board that functions well capable of improving
the operational efficiency of the banks. As for profitability, both good board of commis-
sioners and public transparency are capable of increasing the bank operational profit-
ability in Indonesia.  
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 A B S T R A K  
Tata kelola perusahaan yang baik (good corporate governance) merupakan aspek 
penting dalam industri perbankan karena bagian terbesar dari sumber dananya dari
masyarakat. Dua aspek penting dari tata kelola perusahaan yang baik adalah peranan 
dewan komisaris dan transparansi. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menilai efek dari
penerapan tata kelola yang baik, yang ditunjukkan oleh peran dewan komisaris dan
transparansi pada kondisi keuangan dan non-keuangan, terhadap efisiensi operasional 
dan profitabilitas bank umum nasional di Indonesia. Penelitian ini menggunakan data
dari tiga puluh enam bank selama lima tahun, dari 2008 sampai 2012. Random effect
panel digunakan untuk menganalisis data karena teknik ini dapat meningkatkan daya 
analisis statistik. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dalam hal efisiensi hanya
dewan komisaris yang berfungsi dengan baik dan mampu meningkatkan efisiensi
operasional bank. Adapun profitabilitas, baik dewan komisaris dan transparansi pub-
lik juga mampu meningkatkan profitabilitas operasional perbankan di Indonesia.  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The economic crisis of 1998 has provided invalu-
able lessons for Bank Indonesia, as banking regula-
tors, and for banking industries in Indonesia as a 
whole. This crisis clearly shows that even the condi-
tion of the banking that seems healthy is very vul-
nerable to economic shocks. The impact of the crisis 
on the banking industries in Indonesia could be 
seen, among other things, from the drop of bank 
capital (even some bank capital is negative), the 
surge in NPLs, and the bank forced closure to 
mergers between banks. 
One of the main programs for revitalizing In-
donesian banks after the 1998 crisis was the imple-
mentation of the Indonesian Banking Architecture 
which was launched by Bank Indonesia on January 
9, 2004. One of the fundamental factors underlying 
this Architecture is the weak banking capacity as 
characterized by a lack of corporate governance 
and core banking skills in most of the banks so that 
the necessary remedies are essential. Considering 
this problem, one of the six pillars of the Indone-
sian Banking Architecture program is creating good 
corporate governance in order to strengthen the 
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internal condition of the national banking system. 
Since 2006 until today, Bank Indonesia has issued 
various regulations with a view to strengthening 
the governance of banks in Indonesia. 
Good Corporate Governance is a set of rules 
governing the relationship between shareholders, 
corporate managers, creditors, government, em-
ployees, and other stakeholders with regard to the 
rights and obligations in order to manage and con-
trol the enterprise in order to achieve optimal busi-
ness performance. Good corporate governance can 
also be interpreted as a way in which the providers 
of funds for the company ensuring that they get 
appropriate returns on their investment (Mayer 
1997). Thus logically, better implementation of 
good corporate governance supported by a reliable 
operational capability is expected to improve the 
operational performance of banks. 
One critical aspect of corporate governance is 
the duties and responsibilities of boards of direc-
tors, or in a two-tier governance system country 
such as Indonesia known as board of supervisor or 
board of commissioners. Researches on corporate 
governance often distinguish between independent 
and non-independent commissioners. The existence 
of boards of commissioners who are competent and 
independent is expected to be able to better moni-
tor and provide more valuable input in solving 
agency problems between owners and managers 
(Fama and Jensen 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
However, the importance of independent 
commissioners is debatable in finance literature. 
Empirical evidence regarding the influence of cor-
porate governance on performance show inconsis-
tent results (Dulewicz and Herbert 2004). Some 
researchers provide evidence that supports the ef-
fectiveness of boards of commissioners in improv-
ing the performance and value of the firm is influ-
enced by the proportion of independent members 
(Weisbach 1988; Rosentein and Wyatt 1990; Brick-
ley et al. 1994). Other researchers obtained results 
that do not support the positive role of independent 
boards of commissioners in improving firm per-
formance (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996, Coles et al. 
2008). 
One of the rational reasons of the latter finding 
is the independent commissioners include politi-
cians, environmental activists, and representatives 
of consumer board. Similar results are also found 
for the number of independent commissioners. The 
empirical evidence shows that a high percentage of 
independent commissioners is related to worse 
corporate performance (Yermack 1996; Klein 1998). 
Another aspect of good corporate governance 
attracting the attention of researchers is transpar-
ency. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2006) requires banks to disclose the financial and 
non-financial conditions to the market participants 
and the public to enable them to assess bank asset 
quality. Disclosure is also intended to increase pub-
lic confidence, both customers and investors, in the 
banking, which can further improve operational 
and stock performance of the bank. Most of the 
empirical evidence shows a positive relationship 
between the overcast disclosure and firm perform-
ance (Lang and Lundholm 1993; Healy et al. 1999; 
Kothari 2001). Disclosure of financial information 
are also able to reduce the informational asymme-
try between managers and investors by lowering 
cost of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Verrec-
chia 2001). On the other hand, other researchers 
obtain evidence of a negative relationship between 
the size of annual reports and stock performance 
(Thompson et al. 2001and the size of annual report 
and operating performance (Jensen et al. 2006). 
The description above shows that the influence 
of the board commissioners and transparency to-
ward firm performance is mixed. Research in this 
topic is mostly done in developed countries in 
which the governance structure has been well-
established and in non-banking industry. In addi-
tion, most of the researches done in countries that 
adopt the one-tier governance system that has only 
one board, namely the board of directors which is 
comprised of the executive directors and non-
executive directors. 
A research on the combining effect of board of 
commissioners and transparency toward bank per-
formance in a country that adopts a two-tier system 
of corporate governance can be of a different out-
come and will enrich the literature on corporate 
governance. Basing on this argument, the purpose 
of this study is to examine the role of the board of 
commissioners and transparency in improving 
bank operating performance, both in terms of effi-
ciency and profitability. This study uses a sample of 
thirty-six national banks during 2008-2012. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESIS 
System and Regulation 
Corporate governance varies between countries, 
especially regarding the board system. There are 
countries that have a one-tier board system, like the 
USA and UK, and there are others that have a two-
tier board system, like Germany, Netherlands, and 
Indonesia. In a one-tier board, all the directors, both 
executive directors as well as non-executive direc-
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tors form one board, called the board of directors. 
In a two-tier board there is an executive board or 
management board (all executive directors) and a 
separate supervisory board or board of commis-
sioners (all non-executive directors).A management 
board oversees the company and provides general 
direction, while a supervisory board must approve 
of major business decisions. 
According to Bank Indonesia Regulation 
No.8/4/PBI/2006, subsequently amended by Bank 
Indonesia Regulation No. 8/14/PBI/2006, the du-
ties and responsibilities of board of commissioners 
are (1) to ensure the implementation of Good Cor-
porate Governance in each of the Bank business 
activities on all organizational levels, (2) to perform 
supervisory function on the implementation of the 
duties and responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
and provide advice to the Board of Directors, and 
(3) to direct, monitor, and evaluate the implementa-
tion of Bank strategic policies. 
The board of commissioners must also ensure 
whether the board of directors’ had taken follows 
up actions on audit findings and recommendations 
from the bank’s internal audit work unit, external 
auditor, Bank Indonesia supervision result and/or 
other authorities’ supervision result. In order to 
support the effectiveness of the implementation of 
its duties and responsibilities, the board of commis-
sioners must at least form an audit committee, a 
risk policy committee, and remuneration and 
nomination committee. 
The assessment of the Good Corporate Gov-
ernance implementation with respect to board 
commissioners covers governance structure, gov-
ernance process, and governance outcome (Bank 
Indonesia Circular Letter No. 15/15/DPNP/2013). 
The board governance structure includes the board 
size, composition (independent and non-
independent), double post, financial relationships, 
and family relationship. The board governance 
process consist of the board appointment, duties 
and responsibilities, meeting frequency, establish-
ment of committees, and involvement in bank op-
erational activities. While the governance outcome 
mainly relates to the quality of board of commis-
sioners recommendation as indicated internally by 
increasing the bank performance, the solution to 
the problems facing the bank, and the achievement 
of stakeholders’ expectations. 
In terms of transparency, Bank Indonesia re-
quires banks to disclose financial and non-financial 
services to stakeholders including quarterly finan-
cial statement announcement, bank product infor-
mation, and procedures for customer complaints 
and dispute settlement to customers (Bank Indone-
sia Circular Letter No. 15/15/DPNP/2013). In ad-
dition, banks are also required to prepare the im-
plementation of good corporate governance report 
and distribute it to the shareholders as well as to 
some selected independent agency, such as con-
sumer protection agencies and research institutes in 
the field of finance, and post the report on the bank 
own website. The bank disclosure covers duties 
and responsibilities of the Board of Commissioners 
and Board of Directors, completion and execution 
of committees’, implementation of compliance, 
internal audit and external audit, implementation 
of risk management including the internal control 
system, provision of funds to related parties and 
large exposures, and bank's strategic plan. 
 
Review of Previous Studies 
This section will discuss previous studies related to 
the role of board commissioners and transparency 
in enhancing bank operating performance. The 
effectiveness of board functions is affected by four 
attributes (Zahra and Pearce 1989), namely compo-
sition and size (independent and dependent), char-
acteristics (background and personality), structure 
(committee and flow of information), and process 
(meeting, evaluation, and formality). 
 
Board of Commissioner and Firm Performance 
Independent commissioners are expected to be the 
provider of important input in the search for effec-
tive solutions to the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders and to be better moni-
tor management actions (Barnhart et al. 1994). In-
dependent commissioners, those who do not have 
direct financial relationships, family ties or inter-
lock with management, are considered more effec-
tive monitors of management because theoretically 
they are less tied to the management (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2003) and have to compete in the labor 
market and therefore have to build a good reputa-
tion as experts in monitoring management (Fama 
and Jensen 1983). Independent commissioners also 
tend to evaluate the executive performance based 
on financial performance, not the subjective one as 
done by dependent commissioner, so as to encour-
age the improvement of the company performance. 
Hence, improvement in corporate board function-
ing should results in improvement of the corporate 
financial performance (Bayesinger and Butler 1985). 
The importance of independent commission-
ers, however, is widely debated in the literature of 
finance. Researches on the independent commis-
sioner ratio and firm performance have yielded 
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correlation ranging from positive to negative, al-
though most of them support the positive relation-
ship. Empirical studies show that there are positive 
and significant relationship between firm perform-
ance and the percentage of independent boards 
(Garcia and Sanchez 2006; Krivogorsky 2006; 
Huang 2010; O’Connel and Cramer 2010; Othman 
2012) and a small rise in stock prices is correlated 
with the announcement of independent directors, 
which reflects the effect of signal (Rosenstein and 
Wyatt 1990). In the case of a tender offer, the find-
ings indicate that the bidding companies domi-
nated by independent boards have less negative 
abnormal return than those dominated by non-
independent boards (Byrd and Hickman 1992) and 
the shareholders of target firms gain larger when 
the majority of boards are independent (Cotter et 
al. 1997). 
Such evidence implies that independent boards 
play their monitoring roles well. Evidence from 
banking industry shows that internal monitoring 
supplied by independent board is generally effec-
tive in enhancing CEO pay for performance 
(Mishra and Nielsen 1999). On the other hand, sev-
eral studies have identified a negative relationship 
between firm performance and the dominance of 
independent boards (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; 
Yermarck 1996). Other studies find no significant 
relationship between the proportion of independ-
ent boards and firm performance (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1991; Dalton et al. 1998; Bhagat and 
Black2002). 
The size of board is considered to be important 
to effectiveness of the board. As the board of com-
missionersis a pool of expertise and human re-
sources to the organization, a large board should 
benefits to the organization (Dalton et al. 1999). 
Large size of board, however, may become less 
effective at monitoring management because of 
free-riding problems amongst members and in-
creased decision-making time (Jensen 1993). With 
respect to the size of independent boards, the re-
sults of previous studies are also mixed. There is 
some evidence that board size is positively corre-
lated with performance of S&P firms (Upadhyay 
2008) and bank performance in one-tier system 
(Grove et al. 2011; Adam and Mehran 2012) and in 
two-tier system (Huang 2010). 
The above evidence is in line with the argu-
ment that large boards are valuable for the informa-
tion they bring and for their advisory services 
(Chaganti et al. 1985). On the other hand, some 
studies show a negative relationship between 
board size and firm performance as measured by 
Tobin Q (Yermack 1996; O’Connel and Cramer 
2010) and ROA (Eisenberg et al. 1998). This sug-
gests that smaller boards are more cohesive and are 
better for decision making. 
Board activity, measured by board meeting 
frequency, is often considered as a significant as-
pect of corporate governance. More often meetings 
are required to enhance cohesiveness between 
members in making decision. Board commissioners 
contribute better to the improvement of firm per-
formance (Brick and Chidambaran 2010; Grove et 
al. 2011). However, there is also evidence that docu-
ment an inverse relation between board meeting 
frequency and firm performance in the meeting 
year (Vafeas 1999). 
Based on the finding of the most previous 
studies on relationship between board of commis-
sioner function and firm performance discussed 
above, this study hypothesizes that: 
H1: Better implementation of board of commis-
sioner functions leads to better bank operating effi-
ciency and profitability. 
 
Transparency and Firm Performance 
Another crucial aspect of the good corporate gov-
ernance practice is transparency or disclosure. Pub-
lic disclosure is a complement to the disciplinary 
mechanism through oversight by bank supervisory 
authorities. For market discipline to be effective, 
the public must obtain sufficient information about 
the current condition of the bank and its prospects 
in the future. Increasing the amount of public dis-
closure is likely to reduce information asymmetries 
that lead to lower firm cost of capital and increase 
firm value (Leuz and Verrechio 2000; Verrechio). 
From the view point of banks, adequate disclosure 
may builds public trust about the banks which in 
turn increases the customer base and ultimately the 
operating performance of the bank. 
Research findings show that increased disclo-
sure is associated with an increase instock return 
(Healy et al. 1999) and disclosure quality is posi-
tively correlated with firm market value and future 
operating performance (Jiao 2011). Evidence from 
banking industry shows that banks disclosing more 
information have lower stock volatility (Baumann 
and Neir 2004) and remuneration disclosure 
brought about by regulatory change has positive 
impact on executive pay-performance relation 
(Clarkson et al. 2011). These findings suggest that 
the disclosure benefits investors and the bank. 
There is also contrary evidence regarding the rela-
tionship of the degree of disclosure and firm per-
formance. Firms with smaller size of annual report 
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have tended to have better subsequent performance 
relative to their industries (Jensen et al. 2006). 
However, the findings suggest that the perform-
ance explanation may notlie in the size of the an-
nual itself, rather than they perform better because 
they are smaller in terms of total assets and more 
focused, with fewer business segments. 
Based on results previous studies, mainly in 
banking industry, on relationship between disclo-
sure and firm performance, this study hypothesizes 
that: 
H2: Better disclosure practice leads to better bank 
operating efficiency and profitability. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Currently, there are 123 commercial banks in Indo-
nesia. This study uses a sample Indonesian Na-
tional Banks from 2007 to 2012. Therefore, the study 
excludes joint venture banks and foreign banks. 
This study also excludes Islamic bank and regional 
development bank because they have specific char-
acteristics that may affect their financial perform-
ance (Lutfi 2010). Last, this study includes only 
banks that publish their good corporate governance 
report on their website. The final sample consists of 
thirty six banks, consisting of four government 
owned banks and thirty two private banks. 
Variables in this study consist of independent 
variables, dependent variables and control vari-
ables. The independent variable is the individual 
scores of duty and responsibility of board of com-
missioners and transparency. Bank Indonesia Cir-
cular Letter No. 9/12/DPNP/2007 requires banks 
to publish the results of their self-assessment on 
good corporate governance implementation; both 
individual and composite scores. The dependent 
variable is bank operating efficiency and profitabil-
ity as measured by operating efficiency ratio and 
operating profit ratio. This study uses the bank size, 
measured by its total asset, as the control variable. 
The detail description and measurement of the 
variables is given below. 
1. Individual score  
Individual score of the implementation of good 
corporate governance is the reciprocal of the scores 
for the duty and responsibility of board commis-
sioners and transparency based on the self-
assessment made by each bank. 
i
i GCG Score
1GCG = . (1) 
GCGi is the Good Corporate Governance score 
of duty and responsibility of board commissioners 
and transparency. 
2. Operating Efficiency and Profitability 
Bank operating efficiency and profitability is meas-
ured using two indicators, namely bank operating 
efficiency ratio (OER) and bank operating profit 
ratio OPR. OER is the ratio operating cost to operat-
ing income. 
OER = 100% x 
Income Operating
Cost Operating , (2) 
 
while OPRis the ratio between operating profit to 
total assets. 
OPR = 100% x 
AssetTotal
Profit Operating  (3) 
3. Size 
This study use bank size as a control variable. It is 
measured as the log normal of the total assets. 
Size = Ln(Total Asset) (3) 
To test the hypothesis, this study uses panel 
data, both fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE). 
Panel data techniques can improve the statistical 
analysis (Altunbas et al. 2000). It controls the het-
erogeneity so that to minimize bias in the results. It 
useful in analyzing financial data involving balance 
sheet and income statement in which the data tend 
to be closely correlated. Panel data give more in-
formation about variability, reduce co-linearity, 
and enlarge degree of freedom and as a whole can 
produce better statistical results. Panel data is also 
often able to explain the changes better than the 
dynamic time series data analysis and cross-
sectional. Panel data provides an opportunity to 
observe the difference in behavior with cross-
sectional and from time to time at a company. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Analysis 
As mention above, the sample of this study covers 
thirty six banks, consisting of four government 
owned banks and thirty two private national banks. 
Table 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics of the 
sample. There is a remarkable difference between 
the average assets of banks owned by the govern-
ment and by the private sector, approximately 
Rp.387, 341,701 million for government-owned 
banks and only Rp.47, 246,257 million for private 
banks. This is not surprising given the state-owned 
banks not only have the support of capital but also 
have access to a low cost source of funds, for exam-
ple in the form of the government budget. The big-
gest asset is owned by one of the state banks, 
namely Bank Mandiri which is the result of a 
merger of four government-owned banks as well. 
Being the greatest assets of private banks is owned 
by Bank Central Asia. 
Government-owned banks also excel in the av-
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erage score of good corporate governance imple-
mentation with respect to the duties and responsi-
bilities of commissioners and transparency com-
pared to private banks. Bank with the worst score 
of duties and responsibilities of board is Bank 
Yudha Bhakti and Bank Mega. Bank Yudha Bhakti 
submitted annual financial statements audited by 
public accountant office that is not registered in 
Bank Indonesia, and therefore it is considered not 
submitted the report yet. For Bank Mega, a case 
that stands out is a conspiracy of deposits amount-
ing of Rp.111million involving Bank Mega Branch 
Manager and Finance Director of Elnusa. 
Another case that struck Bank Mega is disap-
pearance of funds owned by local government in 
Sumatera totaling Rp.80 billion that involves for-
mer head of Bank Mega Jababeka Branch. Both 
cases demonstrate the weakness in monitoring of 
bank conducted by board of commissioners. In 
terms of transparency, implementation of govern-
ment-owned banks in general is better than that of 
private banks. This is most likely because all the 
government-owned banks already listed in the In-
donesia Stock Exchange and has bigger asset so 
that they become public spotlight. 
In terms of operational performance, the gov-
ernment-owned banks have also better operating 
efficiency than those private banks, which is 75.07 
percent compared to 84.27 percent, and better op-
erating profitability, which is 2.51 percent com-
pared to 1.79 percent. The most efficient bank dur-
ing the research period is Bank BRI, one of the gov-
ernment owned bank, and this is may be due its 
largest funding sources comes from saving account 
with low interest rate. Similar to the operating effi-
ciency, the operating profits of government owned 
banks is also, on average, better than that of private 
bank. Better operating performance of government-
owned banks may be due to they have better access 
to low cost funds especially related to government 
budget, a wider operating range so that creating 
economics of scale, and more diverse variety of 
products offered primarily associated with fee-
based income product. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The purposes of this study to examine are (1) the 
impact of duty and responsibility of board commis-
sioners toward bank operating efficiency and prof-
itability, and (2) the impact of transparency toward 
bank operating efficiency and profitability. Table 2 
exhibits the results for the duty and responsibility 
of board commissioners and transparency on bank 
efficiency and profitability, as measured by OER 
and OPR. 
The results show that the implementation of 
the duties and responsibilities of board commis-
sioners has significantly negative effects on bank 
operating efficiency (OER) and positive impact on 
bank profitability, both in fixed effect and random 
effects model. It means that a better board func-
tion cause banks more efficient and more profit-
able. As for transparency, it does not significantly 
affect the level of operating efficiency, but signifi-
cantly affect the operating profitability. Overall, 
the ability of the independent variables in explain-
ing the variation of the dependent variable is quite 
good. On the average, ability of the independent 
variables in explaining the variation in the operat-
ing efficiency of banks is about 77 percent, while 
their ability to explain the operating profitability 
is above 80 percent. Hausman test results (not 
included in this article) show that Random Effect 
model is better than Fixed Effect models in ex-
plaining the operating efficiency, but not for oper-
ating profit. 
According to Bank Indonesia regulation (Bank 
Indonesia Circular Letter No. 15/15/DPNP/2013), 
the assessment of the duty and responsibility of 
board of commissioners consists of board govern-
ance structure (size, composition, and financial and 
family relationship), board governance process 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Research Sample 
 Asset (million IDR) Commissioner Transparency OER OPTA 
Mean 85,034,640 0.70 0.67 83.10 1.88 
- Gov. Owned Bank 387,341,701 0.93 0.72 75.07 2.51 
- Private Bank 47,246,257 0.66 0.66 84.27 1.79 
Median 10,593,593 0.50 0.50 85.22 1.68 
Maximum 563,105,056 1.00 1.00 119.13 5.08 
Minimum 896,126 0.33 0.25 60.87 -1.33 
Standard Deviation 145,102,153 0.26 0.26 8.84 1.09 
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(duties and responsibility, meeting frequency, 
board committee), and governance outcome (qual-
ity of recommendation). The results show that 
boards of commissioners dominated by the inde-
pendents are able to effectively deliver the best 
solution to the agency problem between manage-
ment and owners and better able to monitor the 
decisions and actions of the executive (Barnhart et 
al. 1994), and this is in line with agency theory as 
suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983). 
Bank Indonesia Regulation requires that the 
majority of board members must not have any 
financial relationship and family relationship with 
fellow board members and/or board of directors. 
Consequently, independent commissioners don 
not hesitate to question management actions 
deemed inconsistent with the interests of the 
company because basically they do not have any 
link with executives (Hermalin and Weisbach 
2003). Another duty of the board of commission-
ers is to direct, monitor, and evaluates the imple-
mentation of the Bank's strategic policy. Accord-
ing to stewardship theory of corporate governance 
(Donaldson 1990), the board must be structured in 
such a way so that it facilitates the achievement of 
corporate goals by providing clear, consistent role 
expectation and authorizes and empower senior 
management. The results suggest that independ-
ent commissioners tend to use measurable indica-
tors to assess executive performance, such as earn-
ings performance (Bayesinger and Butler 1985), 
thus providing clear guidance as to what is 
achieved by the executives. 
The size of commissioners also plays an impor-
tant role in improving bank operating performance. 
Bank Indonesia regulation also requires that bank 
commissioners should have adequate knowledge of 
the operating, risk management and good corpo-
rate governance of banks. Since board is a collection 
of expertise and human resources, larger board will 
provide companies with diverse educational and 
industrial backgrounds and skills and with multi-
ple perspectives that improved the quality of ac-
tions taken by the firm (Chaganti et al. 1985; Dalton 
et al. 1999). In additions, as the board size increase 
it become more difficult for the directors to exercise 
their power in taking actions that deviate from the 
interest of shareholders. In sum, larger board size 
improves the bank performance, both in term effi-
ciency and profitability. 
Another important aspect of board commis-
sioners is board committee. Bank Indonesia regula-
tion requires banks to establish at least three com-
mittees, namely audit committee, risk policy com-
mittee and remuneration and nomination commit-
tee. The main function of audit committee is to 
make recommendation to board of commissioners 
regarding the implementation of the Internal Audit 
Unit task, appropriateness of the audit by the pub-
lic accounting firm with auditing standards appli-
cability, appropriateness of financial statements 
and accounting standards applicability follow-up 
by the executives on the findings of the Internal 
Audit Unit, public accountants, and the results of 
Bank Indonesia's supervision and designation of 
Certified Public Accountants and Public Account-
ing Firm. 
Since the audit committee must consist of peo-
ple who are experts in finance then its presence can 
increase the integrity of financial report and en-
hance public trust (Collier 1997), as well as improve 
the bank efficiency and performance. (Defond et al. 
2005). As to risk policy police committee, it is re-
sponsible for evaluating bank risk management 
policy and evaluating the implementation of Risk 
Management Unit. This committee, therefore, helps 
board of commissioners in disciplining executives 
from taking action that harm or hurt the banks. 
Finally, remuneration and nomination committee is 
responsible for designing and evaluating bank ex-
ecutive remuneration system and policy as well as 
appointment of the bank executive. The existence of 
Table 2 
The Impact of Duty and Responsibility of Board Commissioner and Transparency on  
Bank Efficiency and Profitability 
Fixed Effect Random Effect Variable 
OER OPR OER OPR 
Constant 324.9801 -8.02744 178.8388 -4.1481 
Boards -4.6566 
(-1.9017)** 
0.6176 
(2.3746)* 
-4.7775 
(-2.037)* 
0.6604 
(2.6154)* 
Transparency -1.3304 
(-0.5267) 
0.4889 
(1.8228)** 
-2.1064 
(-0.8847) 
0.5116 
(1.9863)* 
LnTA -7.3135 
(-5.8016)* 
0.2815 
(2.1024)* 
-2.7949 
(-4.8188)* 
0.1598 
(2.2535)* 
Adj-R Square 0.7768 0.8146 0.7616 0.8200 
* Sig. at 5 percent; ** Sig. at 10 percent 
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this committee is able to make executive remunera-
tion better linked to performance and reduce per-
quisite consumption, and therefore improve the 
efficiency and profitability of banks (Wallace and 
Craven 1993) 
The test results also reveal that transparency 
has a positive effect on the bank performance and 
the result is more pronounced in the Random Effect 
model. Regulation on public disclosure (transpar-
ency) is expected to be the complement of regula-
tory supervision. The study shows that transpar-
ency of financial and non-financial bank condition 
is proved to be effective. Disclosure of information 
proved to be effective in providing information to 
the public so that increase public confidence in the 
bank. This indicates that more transparent banks 
are more trusted by the public and hence raise the 
customer-base of those banks. Public is willing to 
put their money in the bank, although wit lower 
yields than those offered by other banks, leading 
them to have a lower cost of capital (Leuzand Ver-
rechio 2000; Verrechio). This ultimately improves 
the operational performance of banks. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION AND LIMITATIONS 
This study aims to examine the effect of board of 
commissioner and transparency practice on bank 
operating efficiency and profitability in Indonesia 
banking industry. Using panel data techniques of 
Fixed Error (FE) and Random Error (RE) modal this 
study conclude that better board of commissioners 
lead to better operating efficiency and profitability. 
With respect to transparency, the results are not 
that clear. Transparency appears to positively affect 
bank profitability, but not bank efficiency. In gen-
eral, banks with better implementation of good 
corporate governance in term bank board of com-
missioners and transparency have better operating 
performance 
There are some implications of the findings to 
future research. First, this study examine on two 
aspects of eleven good corporate governance as-
pects. Future study may examine the individual 
impact of each aspect as well the collective impact 
of good corporate governance practices on bank 
performance. Second, this study mainly uses quan-
titative data on corporate assessment based the 
bank self-assessment. This self-assessment may not 
reflect the actual governance practices, and there-
fore must be supported by deep interview with 
bank officers. Third, this study covers only gov-
ernment owned banks and private banks. Future 
study may consider include regional development 
banks in order to obtain an overall picture of the 
practice of good corporate governanceof banks in 
Indonesia. Last, future study may consider extend-
ing the research period as good corporate govern-
ance impact long-term firm performance rather 
than short-term one. 
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